1 Dangers of Covenant Theology

 A Critique of Gary North’s Anti-Constitutionalism

By Vern Crisler

Copyright, 2006, slightly revised, 2011

Rough Draft

1.  Introduction

2.  Covenant theology vs. Dispensationalism

3.  Theonomy

4.  Reconstructionism

5.  Other Issues

6.  What to Expect

1.  Introduction

For those who do not know who Gary North is, he is a long time financial advisor with a doctorate in history who frequently writes on theological, eschatological, and historical topics.  He was one of the founding members of the politico-theological movement called “reconstructionism” (which also included R. J. Rushdoony and Greg Bahnsen).  In recent years, North has launched a barrage of attacks against the American Constitution.  He regards the American Constitution as a “break” with the “covenantal” colonial past, as a betrayal of the Revolutionary generation, as a product of a Freemason conspiracy, as a design of alchemists, deists, and pantheists, or as a sellout of Christianity, and so on.

It is obvious that North is criticizing the Constitution based on his particular version of a theological model known as “covenant theology.”  This model is sometimes thought of as having to do with eschatology — the doctrine of the last things — and is contrasted with “dispensationalism.”  This paper will not enter into a lengthy discussion of either the theological or eschatological issues, but we would be remiss if we did not at least provide a summary of the basic contrast between covenant theology and dispensationalism (under section 2).

Besides the issue of covenant theology, there is the issue of “theonomy” — a view about how Old Testament law is to be applied in a modern state.  North’s understanding of “theonomy” is really his main motivation for a covenantal critique of the Constitution, and since the Constitution stands in the way of his desired theonomic society, some time will be devoted to a discussion of North’s theonomic views (under section 3).  In addition, as noted above, a movement associated with theonomy, but more comprehensive in its goals, is “reconstructionism,” and we will have a few things to say about it as well (under section 4).  After these preliminaries, the evolution of liberty and the relation between church and state throughout history will be discussed, starting with Constantine down to the time of Calvin and the Puritans of Elizabethan England and New England (chapter 2).  From there focus will be upon the American Revolution and upon North’s view of the American Constitution.  It will be concluded that North has made serious errors in his understanding of the pre- and post-Constitutional periods of our history.

It is very easy to fall into the temptation of dismissing Gary North as a misguided religious individual.  The “Gary North is a Big Fat Idiot” school of criticism might be disappointed that we prefer argument over insult — usually, that is.  Important issues are at stake, for North’s is a major voice in certain Christian circles, and his attack on the American Constitution needs a reasoned response, while dismissive insults can carry only so much water for a preferred conclusion.  Indeed, at one time I thought it was appropriate to refer to North as a virtual traitor to his own country.  This seemed logical since North is an American who is attempting to undermine the Constitution and replace it with something he thinks is better.  Why would an American want to undermine and attack the Constitution unless he was really a traitor at heart?  Therefore, North’s hostility to the Constitution, combined with his anti-American libertarianism (in the extreme Murray Rothbard tradition), led me to keep asking this question.

However, on further reflection, I realized that North had, as far as I am aware, violated no criminal statutes regarding treason — e.g., selling secrets to a foreign nation.  Nor has he attacked the Constitution based on a desire to give foreign nations an advantage over the United States.  Thus, North’s viewpoint was not in and of itself treasonous from either a criminal or a moral point of view.  What then?  If North is not a traitor to his own country, what is wrong with his views?  What shall we say of him?  Has he wasted his doctorate?  Has he gone off the deep-end?  Is he a fanatic?  A lunatic?  A conspiracy nut?  All of the above?  On reflection, the most apt term I could think of to use in describing the views of North is the word Folly.  North’s attack on the American Constitution is an example of a peculiar kind of foolishness, one that could be described as a version of the Utopian folly.  We will discuss this in a subsequent chapter [chapter 10, “End of Utopia].

I worked for North in the early 1980s, and at the time was an admirer of not only North, but also of Rushdoony and Bahnsen.  Sometime in the early 1990s I discovered the philosophy of Karl Popper and his students, which woke me out of what might be called my “Wittgensteinian slumbers.”  While I cannot now follow all of Popper’s views, he did awaken me to the dangers of framework relativism, a type of skepticism that appears to suffuse North’s early writings.  Though he would no doubt eschew its relativistic results, North used it as a weapon against his opponents, not seeming to care that its skeptical principles also undermined his own position.  Since then I’ve focused my intellectual energy on a) historical issues, especially the archaeology of the ancient world, b) the study of logic and logical algorithms, c) the study of scholastic philosophy and philosophical realism, and finally d) the study of, and appreciation for, the governmental principles of the pre-Revolutionary American colonies and of the post-Revolutionary framers of the Constitution.  The latter study has taken me all the way back to the Tudor age, which is where American history really begins, and then forward to what could aptly be called the “last English rebellion” — i.e., the American Revolution.

2.  Covenant theology vs. Dispensationalism

Covenant theology is essentially the notion that there is one covenant of grace.  In this view, all post-Fall covenants of the Old Testament are gracious covenants.  All such covenants — including the Mosaic — are part of the one covenant of grace, differing only in administration, not in substance.

Dispensationalism, on the other hand, rejects covenant theology and teaches that God has separate purposes for national Israel and Christianity.  C. I. Scofield was the chief propagator of the latter view in modern church history, and his version of the Bible contains “dispensational” interpretations in the margins.[1]

In the theology of the New Testament, the nation of Israel failed to live up to the stipulations of the Mosaic covenant.  Since observing these covenant stipulations was a requirement for remaining in the covenant, the Israelites’ failure (as a nation) brought about a rejection of Israel.  Dipensationalists believe that Israel is still the recipient of the promises of God, and that the Christian church is merely a “parenthesis” in the plan of God.  They deny that the promises to Israel were conditional.

In contrast to Dispensationalism, the New Testament teaches that in place of national Israel, the kingdom was given to Spiritual Israel, those who are of the faith of Abraham (which now includes Gentiles).  Christian theology interprets this Spiritual Israel as identical to the Christian church (primarily in its “invisible” or eschatological aspect).  The Mosaic covenant and nation have been replaced with a New Covenant and a new (spiritual) nation.  This is the redemptive-historical interpretation.  (It should be pointed out that this marginalized Israel of the redemptive-historical interpretation has nothing to do with any modern day political agenda with respect to the state of Israel.)

So what about covenant theology?  Does it make the same dispensational mistake of supposing the Mosaic covenant to have continuing validity?  Or does it agree with the redemptive-historical view?  In a way, both.  On the one hand, it accepts the church as the Spiritual Israel that takes the place of (ancient) national Israel.  On this point, covenant theology is in line with the New Testament.  On the other hand, however, it appears to fall into the error of the dispensationalists by failing to recognize that the Mosaic covenant was a conditional covenant, and has no continuing validity, whether for national Israel or for the church.

It is true that Old Testament saints even in the Mosaic period were saved by grace through faith (as covenant theologians acknowledge), but this only refers to personal or individual salvation, and this individualism in salvation is correlated by the New Testament to the Abrahamic covenant.  The Mosaic covenant, however, is not a covenant with individuals, but with a nation.  This is all important in understanding the covenants of the Bible.  Likewise, the New Covenant in Christian theology is God’s covenant with a nation — with a “Spiritual” nation, its terms fulfilled by Jesus.  Covenant theologians are somewhat schizophrenic about the Mosaic covenant, believing that a works principle was involved with the Mosaic covenant, but at the same time, that it was an “administration” of the covenant of grace.

Covenant theologians, in the main, regard the pre-Fall Adamic covenant as a conditional covenant of works.  At least most think this, for a few have taken it upon themselves to deny that the Adamic covenant could be described as a covenant of works, i.e., it is held that all covenants in the Bible are gracious covenants, never conditional, even the pre-Fall covenant.  Advocates of this view are supporters of what has been called the “Federal Vision” — but it is a subject beyond the scope of this paper.  Suffice it to say, many theologians have seen this “mono-covenantal” view as having deleterious consequences for the Reformed understanding of the doctrine of justification.[2]

The important thing to note about the “covenant” with Adam is that it was a covenant with an individual.  The covenant with Adam was conditional, while the covenant with another individual Abraham is unconditional.  Thus, at the individual level, the Adamic covenant was a covenant of works and the Abrahamic covenant was a covenant of grace.  In contrast, the Mosaic covenant was a covenant with a nation, and the conditionalism of this covenant applies only to the nation, not to individuals.  The following provides a chart of the most important distinctions between the covenants: 

Conditional (works) Unconditional (grace)
Adamic (individual) Abrahamic (individual)
Mosaic (national) New Covenant (Spiritual nation)

Covenant theology, as noted, tends to think of the Mosaic covenant as under the second column, an administration of the one covenant of grace.  Moreover, some covenant theologians go on to argue that modern-day nations can enter into a covenant with God just as ancient Israel did.  Critics would say that this sets up a dangerous form of continuity between a modern nation-state and the ancient polity of Israel.

Advocates of covenant theology, of course, would dismiss Dispensationalism as essentially based on sub-standard theology and exegesis, despite its popularity among the “Left Behind” crowd and among those who were weaned on the Scofield Reference Bible.  On the other hand, critics of covenant theology would dismiss covenant theology — at least in its strong form — as sub-standard, too.  A more moderate form of covenant theology could very well pass theological muster, but we are concentrating on the strong form advocated by North.

3.  Theonomy

Gary North is one of the leading proponents of “theonomy” — the view that all the Mosaic laws and penalties should be applied by modern states.  Theonomists such as North have been criticized for not recognizing the political uniqueness of Israel.  Despite responses to this charge, it does not appear to these critics that theonomists really “get it” — that Israel was the only nation that could ever have entered into a Mosaic-type covenant with God.  Instead, theonomists argue that since the nations of the ancient world were required to keep the law of God in exhaustive detail, the uniqueness of ancient Israel as the peculiar people of God is compatible with the application of the Mosaic law in exhaustive detail to non-Mosaic nations of both the ancient world and today.  Hence, the uniqueness argument (offered principally by Meredith Kline) cannot, in the view of theonomists, undermine the application of the Mosaic law in exhaustive detail to modern states. 

On the basis of biblical statements, e.g., Psalm 2, which speak of the need for the nations to obey God, theonomists argue that modern states also must obey God.  This is usually couched in the language of “exhaustive detail.”  Because God requires all nations to obey him, it follows that ancient states — and by analogy — modern states, should obey God’s law in exhaustive detail.  Contrary to the position of theonomy, however, there is actually no verse of the Bible that required the nations of the ancient world to obey the Mosaic law in exhaustive detail.  In our opinion, those who make this claim are guilty of the logical fallacy of illicit process.  One cannot go from a general or indefinite requirement that all the nations should seek instruction from God and serve him (as in Psalm 2, etc.) to the conclusion that the nations should keep all the specific or definite prohibitions or positive requirements found in the law of Moses (as argued by Greg Bahnsen in Theonomy in Christian Ethics, pp. 339ff.).  All that could really be argued from Psalm 2 type passages is that the nations should keep the general moral laws of God and serve him in accordance with those moral laws.

In the Bible, Leviticus 18:3-4 and surrounding texts are probably the only ones that bear directly on the subject of specific case laws binding on the Gentiles, but the laws separating Jews from the evil practices of the Gentiles are not part of an exhaustive list — as the theonomic thesis requires.  In other words, even if every one of the laws mentioned in the Leviticus injunctions were binding on all the ancient nations, this would not in itself prove that all the Mosaic prohibitions or positive commands (from Exodus to Deuteronomy) were binding on those non-Mosaic nations.

Thus, on the one hand, the theonomic thesis is too weak — there is not enough evidence from the Bible to show that all the nations were required to keep the Mosaic law in its entirety.  One would have to commit either an illicit process fallacy or a hasty generalization in order to establish such a claim.  On the other hand, the theonomic thesis is too strong.  If theonomists were successful in showing that all the laws of the Old Testament were binding upon non-Mosaic nations, Israel would then have no uniqueness, would not be a “peculiar” people.  Israel would end up with too much continuity with the nations of the ancient world so that the Leviticus injunctions would be pointless in their specificity. 

Theonomists might reply that this emphasis on Israel’s uniqueness makes the law different for Jews and Gentiles.  However, critics would reply that this uniqueness only means that God has not entered into a covenant with the Gentiles, and that they obey the moral law of God that is referred to as a law “by nature” (Romans 2).  Thus, while the Jews were required to obey the laws of the covenant, the Gentiles obeyed the laws of nature, or natural law.  The basic moral principles are the same in both cases.

Unlike North, philosopher Greg Bahnsen was worried that theonomy would be dismissed as being opposed to the American Constitution.  To forestall this, he claimed that there was a separation of church and state in ancient Israel.  This strategy, however, seems problematic, for Bahnsen’s functional separation between church and state in ancient Israel seems anachronistic when applied to the constitutional notion of separation of church and state as referred to in today’s usage.  It is not our intent to spend a great deal of time discussing Bahnsen’s views, nor are we here challenging his views at any great depth, for as we said, Bahnsen supported the Constitution.

Briefly, Bahnsen rested his theonomic thesis upon Matthew 5:17, where Jesus says he has not come to destroy but to fulfill the law and the prophets.  Unfortunately, this verse may prove too much if interpreted in light of the theonomic thesis, for then the ceremonial, sacrificial, or ethnic laws of the Old Testament would be binding on Gentiles, a conclusion at variance with the teachings of St. Paul.  Bahnsen, of course, realized this and attempted to give theological reasons why Gentiles were not to observe these aspects of the Mosaic law.  However, such attempts appear to everyone but theonomists as special pleading.  Jesus seems to have made it very clear that there were no exceptions.  Either we obey all of the law, including the ceremonial aspects, or we adopt a different interpretation of Jesus’s words.  The latter alternative is what most biblical interpreters would choose (and I’ve come around to this myself, having formerly supported Bahnsen’s interpretation).  In any case, the issue of the proper interpretation of Matthew 5:17, or whether Bahnsen’s version of theonomy is compatible with the Constitution, etc., would be topics of great interest, but our focus on North’s views will oblige us to say little of it at this stage.  Besides, Rushdoony and North had already gone into print advocating reconstructionism before Bahnsen’s exegetical arguments were deployed in support of theonomy.[3]

4.  Reconstructionism

Reconstructionism is an idea that combines theonomy with post-millennialism and Cornelius Van Til’s system of presuppositional apologetics.  R. J. Rushdoony developed reconstructionism by putting together the basic concepts of covenantalism and the Dutch-Calvinist notion of “sphere laws” formulated by statesman Abraham Kuyper and the philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd.  Rushdoony says,

“The idea of sphere laws is basic to Christian orthodoxy and to an understanding of Western history.”[4]

In the past, covenantalism was restricted to church or politics.  Ecclesiastical or political bodies covenanted with God to obey his covenantal stipulations (the Old Testament judicials).  In return, such convenanted parties would receive God’s blessings as a reward.  Rushdoony expands the covenantal range to include all spheres of life, not just the ecclesiastical or political:

“[T]he Kingdom of God includes every area of life, and every institution which obeys his commandments.  Thus, church, civil government, school, agriculture, art, business, every realm under God’s law is an area of Kingdom activity.”[5]

It is not clear whether Dooyeweerd understood sphere sovereignty in quite this way, but under Rushdoony’s interpretation, man is to exercise dominion over all of creation, applying the laws of God to all areas of life.  Man functions in numerous law spheres, all of which are independent of one another but unified under God:

“A man’s life involves a number of law spheres, each with its own integrity.  As [man]…moves from sphere to sphere, he moves also from one law-realm to another over and over through the course of the day.”[6]

There is no doubt that North would agree with this, but there is one problem — contrary to reconstructionism, the Bible does not claim to apply to all areas of life.  Science textbooks contain all sorts of facts and figures, but none requires knowledge of biblical principles in order to learn or master them.  Likewise, a music theory book contains all sorts of notes, lines, and chord structures, but these can be learned without any knowledge of biblical principles.  This is true with just about any other sphere one could name.  In fact, success in all these other spheres of life usually requires that one distance oneself from the inherent didacticism that comes from attempting to apply the Bible, in covenantal fashion, to every area of life.  I know of no reconstructionist who has ever made any significant contribution to literature, art, music, or cinema, or to much of anything else.  Those who have accepted Rushdoony or North’s slogans about pressing the crown rights of Jesus into every realm, merely end up being disillusioned.  Having been told that the Bible applies to all of life, they eventually wonder why they haven’t succeeded in producing anything worthwhile at a cultural level.

With regard to sphere laws, Dooyeweerd’s “sphere” approach to philosophy is problematic in itself, and in any case, these spheres were not specifically meant to be governed by the Bible.  North even refers to them as “empty” Dooyeweerdian spheres.  This is not quite accurate.  They are nearly empty Dooyeweerdian spheres, since their basic structure includes necessary conditions of possibility, or “pre-conditions,” not actual scientific or historical material.  But pre-conditions are at least something.

Perhaps C. S. Lewis’s comments are a propos in this connection.  He pointed out that the Bible offered no theory of literature:  “Now the New Testament has nothing at all to tell us of literature.”[7]  In this view, the Bible may use many literary devices and a variety of pictures or images to express theological truths, but  literature, to use Lewis’s image, is like boiling an egg — it is done much the same way for both Christians and non-Christians.[8]  For Lewis, Christian literature is done, “by the means common to all literature; it could succeed or fail only by the same excellences and the same faults as all literature; and its literary success or failure would never be the same thing as its obedience or disobedience to Christian principles.”[9]

One can generalize Lewis’s comments from the subject of literature to all other “spheres” of life.  Christians contribute to these “spheres” (physics, biology, history, music, gardening, etc.) by the means common to all sciences or crafts, succeeding or failing only in respect of the high standards demanded by those subjects.  Success or failure in (say) science, music, or tennis, cannot be analogous to living up to or disobeying biblical moral principles.  It is therefore merely a quixotic pursuit to apply the Bible to all of these various subjects.  I do not mean to create a straw man, but there is little purpose for a Christian to advise an auto mechanic that the principles of car repair can be found in the Bible.  However, I’m sure there are some reconstructionists who will still make the attempt, just as I once did in attempting to apply biblical principles to accounting — a futile endeavor if ever there was one.

Even when the Bible speaks of theology, ethics, or history — the Bible’s main concerns — it does not do so in a systematic way, but over time, and with different, albeit harmonious, voices.  Theologians, ethicists, and historians must systematize all of the material found in the Bible.  It is not a systematic theology book, nor is it a textbook on ethics, nor is it a history book in the modern sense of the term.  These have to be developed out of the Bible by a process of interpretation, both at the lay and professional levels.  Reconstructionists only invite skepticism or disappointment when they attempt to stretch the Bible into those areas that were not its concern.  The Bible is first and foremost a sermon from God to man.  To be sure, men must submit to the authority of the Bible, but only with respect to all those issues the Bible specifically addresses, and only after competent and responsible exegesis determines the meaning and application of any particular text to those issues.

The late Henry Morris emphasized the need for Christians to follow the “dominion mandate” whereby men and women are enjoined to be stewards over God’s creation:

“Christians often fail to realize their own ongoing responsibility in this connection.  Engineers and geologists, doctors and lawyers, teachers and technicians, businessmen and housewives, all are responsible to function under the Dominion Mandate in whatever ways are appropriate for their vocation.”[10]

It is important to see that Morris does not advise engineers, geologists, doctors, lawyers, et al., to refer to the Bible in order to fulfill their vocations.  Instead he says that they are to function under the dominion mandate in whatever ways are “appropriate” for that vocation.  Certainly, no one would accuse Morris of not attempting to relate the Bible to science!  Yet his approach is more in the tradition of Lewis than it is of the “reconstructionists,” who also emphasized the dominion mandate.

Morris wrote many books.  He achieved some fame with his textbook on civil engineering — even more with his books on the Genesis Flood, on biblical history, and biblical exegesis — but I have never heard that he was attempting to “reconstruct” the science of civil engineering, or pressing the crown rights of King Jesus into civil engineering.  His basic approach was to harness the science of civil engineering, hydrology, etc., to the subject of Biblical history, i.e., applying civil engineering to the Bible rather than the other way around.

5.  Other Issues

On the subject of postmillennialism, I personally deem it an exegetical failure, but eschatology is really a side issue, and I won’t pursue it any further in this essay.  Van Til’s system of apologetics (known as “presuppositionalism”) has its good points, but his method of transcendental argument for the existence of God has met with opposition even from those well-disposed to his views (Frame, et al.).  Nevertheless, the issue of apologetics is really not relevant in this context, since at most we are interpreting the Bible, not defending it.  Moreover, it should not come as a surprise to anyone who is familiar with Van Til, that he himself rejected theonomy, and specifically North’s version of theonomy!  And as North is also well aware, Van Til was an amillennialist in his eschatology, not a postmillennialist.  Lastly, I know of no evidence that Van Til opposed the American founding fathers, or that he was anything other than a patriotic American, who loved his country and Constitution.

6.  What to Expect [written in 2006]

The above discussion has been an attempt to trace some of the influences on North’s view of the Constitution, but it would be a mistake to claim that theonomy, reconstructionism, or presuppositionalism are alone responsible for North’s understanding of the Constitution.  Not all theonomists, for instance, would agree with North.  The discussion is meant to provide background for North’s views, not to show any justificatory links between his views and the views of theonomists.  As it stands now, one could argue that I’m completely wrong in my criticisms of theonomy or reconstruction but still accept my criticisms of North’s view of the Constitution.  In fact, it will not take much reading of American history to see how incorrect North is regarding the Constitution.  This is somewhat encouraging in that one does not have to become either an expert in biblical theology or an expert in American constitutional history in order to refute North.  It just takes a little bit of common sense.

Readers are encouraged to study these issues on their own since a basic understanding of our American founding will help develop an appreciation of what the framers were trying to accomplish.  Non-Americans may also achieve a better understanding of where America came from, and how much it has changed since its founding, whether for good or ill.

The following provides an outline of the basic arguments against North’s understanding of the Constitution, and I will be writing essays in the new few months in an attempt to prove these basic concepts:

a.  There was no national government at the time of the Federal Constitution, so there was no national covenant to break in the first place.  The government under the Articles of Confederation was not a national government.  It is hard for us to understand this since we see the federal government today as this huge, bloated institution.  We have to put ourselves back in the framers’ day.  For them the only national government was in England.  After the Revolution, all the colonies became sovereign states.  The Articles were a treaty between sovereign states, not a charter for a national government.  Thus, there was no betrayal of Christianity involved in setting aside the Articles and ratifying the Constitution.

b.  All questions about morals-legislation and religion were matters for the various colonies (or states).  The framers of the Constitution might have wanted the states to conform to the federal example with regard to religious tests, but such interference with state laws and practices would have sunk the new Constitution.  Eventually, all the states followed the federal example, the Unitarian takeover of churches providing a good reason for removing state support for any denomination.

c.  The states did not feel as though the federal Constitution was taking away their power to establish their own morals-legislation or religious practices.  They always had that power, even under the British crown.  That is why many of the former colonies still had established religions even years after the federal Constitution was ratified.

d.  The state courts of the early 1800s rejected the “Jeffersonian interpretation” and upheld laws against Sabbath violation and blasphemy.  (Note well that Jefferson was not a framer, but was in Europe during the convention.)  These law-breakers cited some of Jefferson’s posthumous works to justify throwing out such religiously based morals-legislation, but the courts were decisive in ruling against such a view.

e.  Even if we grant, for purposes of argument, that the framers were bad people, French-inspired rationalist wannabes, or conniving freemasons bent on ridding the world of Christianity, such a fact would still be irrelevant.  It was not the framers, nor Jefferson, nor French philosophes, who ratified the Constitution.  It was the states — states that had their own religious tests for office, and who enacted morals-legislation as they saw fit, who ratified the Constitution.  The states would not have ratified it if they thought the new national government was going to force them to give up their state covenants.

f.  The anti-Federalists objected to the new Constitution, but not for any reason having to do with religion or morals-legislation.  They opposed what they thought was too much concentration of power (e.g., standing armies).  If the Constitution was an attempt to subvert Christianity, the anti-Federalists would have brought that up during the process of ratification.  They didn’t.  Or at least hardly any did.  And it’s not surprising since such matters were under the jurisdiction of the colonies or states, and always had been.

g.  The pre-Constitutional period was not quite as “covenantal” as North thinks, nor was the post-Constitutional period quite as anti-covenantal as North thinks.

h. One can argue that the framers should have made the Constitution into an explicitly Christian covenant, but as noted, this would likely have killed the new Constitution.  The question of slavery is a case in point.  Many framers felt it was an inhumane practice, but they also realized they could not legislate in this area since it would lose many of the southern states.  Such issues of morality — and religion — were too much under the jurisdiction of the states, and the framers could only do what was possible, not what was always the best.

i.  North’s claims are misguided.  He should look to the later history of America to see where it turned away from its first loves, religion and morality.

[1] For an overview, see V. S. Poythress, Understanding Dispensationalists, 1987; cf. also T. Ice & H. W. House, Dominion Theology: Blessing or Curse?, 1988, Chapter 9.

[2] For one Reformed denomination’s response, see: http://www.opc.org/GA/justification.pdf

[4] Rousas J. Rushdoony, This Independent Republic, 1964, p. 146.

[5] Rushdoony, p. 149.

[6] Rushdoony, p. 150.

[7] C. S. Lewis, Christian Reflections, 1967, p. 3.

[8] Lewis, p. 1; cf. comments on a “Christian cookery book.”

[9] Lewis, pp. 1-2.

[10] Henry Morris, For Time and Forever, excerpts in Acts & Facts, 2006, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 5; published by Institute for Creation Research.